# FTP

## FTP

### 1AC

**Our discussions cannot be based on ideal theory—policy discussions are key but policies mean nothing unless they change the values to the people they affect.**

Dr. Tommy J. **Curry 1***The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century*. 20**14**

Despite the pronouncement of **debate** as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which **sees** the adjudication of **material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other**. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.”At the most general level, **the** conceptual **chasm between** what emerges as ***actual* problems** in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) **and how we frame such problems** *theoretically*—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—**is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm**, since such a paradigm **insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively**. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that **for any** actual-empirical-observablesocial phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. **This gap between what is *actual***(in the world), **and what is represented** by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds **threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations**. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” **so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete,** incorrect, **or** ultimately **irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address**. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social ph,enomenon—meaning **we cannot suggest that** the **various complexities of social problems** (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) **are totalizable by** any **one set of theories within an ideological frame** **be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism,** or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to *only* do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position thatDr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

**The roll of the ballot is to endorse the debater who provides the best paradigmatic approach to deconstructing antiblackness. The curry 14 evidence contextualizes that in order to have any productive discourse that is able to affect material conditions, we must engage with the values associated with those conditions, i.e the paradigm. Having a paradigmatic approach to deconstructing antiblackness means having the best methodology constructed through value reorientations that can uniquely change the values embedded within existing antiblack structures by using those structures to create tangible policies.**

**The roll of the judge is to be an inclusive educator invested in the well-being of disadvantaged students that questions Eurocentric ideologies.  *(Accessibility is a multiplier for all your impacts.)***

**HENDRICKS current Prof of Biblical Interpretation at the New York Theological Seminary 1995** Osayande Obery; “Guerrilla exegesis: 'struggle' as a scholarly vocation: a postmodern approach to African-American interpretation” Semeia Volume: 72 Issue: Month/Year: 1995 Pages:

Likewise, **guerrilla exegesis is not afraid to call Eurocentrism demonic. Not banal Europe-centered ethnocentrism, but a white supremacist historiographic distortion casting Europeans as subjects and the rest of the world as objects, mere dark props on a white stage. The European as the chosen, the non-European "other” as the wretched. The European as civilized, the dark "other" as savage. Neither is guerrilla exegesis afraid to name white supremacy and its historiographic expression, Eurocentrism, as those it seeks not to disable, but to destroy. For it is precisely these demonic supremacist notions, inscribed in the discourse of Euro-Western** biblical **scholarship, that destroyed the guerrilla’s scholarly slumber and forced him to raise the buckskin banner,** forced him to write with the two-edged sword. **Guerrilla exegesis is bold. Asks questions.** Seeks crisp formulations and precise, clearly enunciated notions. **Cutting conceptualizations and slashing articulations.** Sheep-from-goats articulations. ·wheat-from-chaff articulations'. As in 'Afrocentricity is a response to the horror of Eurocentricity.' Not something that jes' growed like Topsy. Not an ontological reality permeating every culture on the African continent like air. Not a Diopsian cultural unity. Not a conjure of the shaman or a trick of the thaumaturge. Neither the smooth street song of the mack nor the mystery of the metaphysician. No, **it is a self-determining stance, a deep**-throated **loud** shouted fist balled up kiss-my-wrist **response to Eurocentric negation of dark humanity**, as in "we somebody, too, sucker," in all its profundity. **A response to negation. A response to horror. A response to hegemonic aesthetic notions,** to "good hair" and "bad hair." A response to the **myths of blk inferiority, attenuated intellectuality/, out-: of-control sexuality, and innate basketballity. A response to every history textbook ever used in every primary and secondary educational institution in America. Every college and university. A response to the notion of European cultural articulations as the classical cultural expression of all of humanity.** A response to Alan Bloom and Arthur Schlesinger, to Pats Moynihan, Buchanan, and Robertson, to vile racist politicians, to Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan, **to the cowardly all AmeriKKKan tormentors of the throbbing bodies of blk folk**, **to racist** biblical **interpretations and racist exegeses purveyed** **by racist** preachers and racist **scholars.** A response to the white-Jesus-Nordic-Jesus- Germanic-Jesus-it-doesn't-matter-what-color-Jesus-is racist discourse (if it don't matter, Boss den why you keep on making him look European?).

**Black males are becoming extinct, the violence inflicted upon them is happening on a metaphysical level—state sanctioned violence by use of handguns are dehumanizing the black male and associating our every moral plea with the black male as animal**

Tommy J. **Curry 2**—20**14** (Associate Professor of Philosophy @ TAMU, “Michael Brown and the Need for a Genre Studies of Black Male Death and Dying,” Theory and Event 17.3 (2014))

**The Black male is not born a patriarchal male. He is raced and sexed peculiarly,** configured as barbaric and savage**, imagined to be a** violent **animal, not a human being. His mere existence ignites the negrophobia taken to be the agreed upon justification for his death.** **Black male death lessens their economic competition** with, **as well as their political radicality against, white society.** It is this fear of Black males that allows society to support the imposition of death on these bodies, and consent to the rationalizations the police state offer as their justifications for killing the Black-male beast (the rapist, the criminal, and the deviant-thug). **The young Black male’s death**, the death of Black boys**, is merely an extension of this logic—the need to destroy the Black beast cub before it matures into full pathology.** The Black boy, that child, is seen as the potential Nigger-beast. This anti-Black dynamic which specifically affects the Black boy has been referred to by Elaine Brown as a new kind of racism, a racism built upon the anti-Black mythology of America’s Black males as the super-predator. This super-predator mythology not only acts to legitimize the violence responsible for the deaths of Black males, but inculcates the rationalization that given what Black males actually are, Black male death is necessary and an indispensable strategy for the safety and security of American society**. Overlooking the genocidal disposition of America towards Black males presents an incomplete diagnosis of the** impetus behind the **levels of violence and sanctions imposed upon Black communities** (Black women, Black families) **in an effort to control the lives of young Black males**. Even childhood cannot protect young Black boys from the genocidal logics of American society. “Black boys are seen as more culpable for their actions (i.e., less innocent) within a criminal justice context than are their peers of other races.” **Because Black boys are** actually **perceived as older** as **and hence more culpable for their behavior, there is an implicit dehumanization that** “not only predicts racially disparate perceptions of Black boys but also **predicts racially disparate police violence toward Black children in real-world settings.”** Police often imagine the Black boy—a child—to be physically threatening; the manifestation of the savagery thought to be inherent to his Black maleness; a violent beast and predator. **The association of Black males with animals,** specifically apes and monkeys, **diminishes our sympathies for their humanity;** caricatures found to not only increase the propensity for, **but also the acceptance of greater levels of violence directed towards them**. Phillip A. Goff’s implicit bias research has explained that the association between the Negro and ape is not simply an abstract and detached stereotype, but rather a historical trope used to justify the dehumanization of Black people which is “a method by which individuals and social groups are targeted for cruelty, social degradation, and state-sanctioned violence.” **Black male death and dying is the result of this engineered societal program**, **and the machinations of this apparatus obscures** and in many cases denies **our ability to see the lives of Black men and boys as worthwhile.**

#### Empirics are on our side

Jon **Swaine** January 2 20**16** He previously covered the U.S. for the Daily Telegraph. Young Black Men Killed by U.S. Police at Highest Rate in Year of 1,134 Deaths Final total of people killed by U.S. police officers in 2015 shows rate of death for young black men was five times higher than white men of the same age. Jon Swaine is the Guardian's U.S. correspondent based in New York. <http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/young-black-men-killed-us-police-highest-rate-year-1134-deaths>

**Young black men were nine times more likely than other Americans to be killed by police officers in 2015**, according to the findings of [a Guardian study](http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database) that recorded a final tally of 1,134 deaths at the hands of law enforcement officers this year. **Despite making up only 2% of the total US population, African American males** between the ages of 15 and 34 **comprised more than 15% of all deaths logged this year by** an ongoing investigation into **the use of deadly force by police.** Their rate of police-involved deaths was five times higher than for white men of the same age. Paired with official government mortality data, this new finding indicates that about **one in every 65 deaths of a young African American man in the US is a killing by police**. “This epidemic is disproportionately affecting black people,” said Brittany Packnett, an activist and member of the White House taskforce on policing. “We are wasting so many promising young lives by continuing to allow this to happen.” Speaking in the same week that a police officer in Cleveland, Ohio, [was cleared by a grand jury over the fatal shooting of Tamir Rice](http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/28/tamir-rice-shooting-no-charges-cleveland-officer-timothy-loehmann), a 12-year-old African American boy who was carrying a toy gun, Packnett said the criminal justice system was presenting “no deterrent” to the excessive use of deadly force by police. “Tamir didn’t even live to be 15,” she said. Protests accusing law enforcement officers of being too quick to use lethal force against unarmed African Americans have spread across the country in the 16 months since dramatic unrest gripped Ferguson, Missouri, following the fatal police shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown by a white officer. Overall in 2015, black people were killed at twice the rate of white, Hispanic and native Americans. **About 25% of the African Americans killed were unarmed, compared with 17% of white people.**

**AND, the death of black males is rooted within the gun culture in America. This culture was born from the inception of American democracy.**

Lev **Raphael 2015** is the author of twenty-five books in nearly a dozen different genres. Raphael is best known as a pioneer in writing fiction and creative non-fiction about the children of Holocaust survivors, which he's been publishing since 1978, before almost any other American author. “Meaningful Gun Control Will Never Happen in the U.S.” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lev-raphael/meaningful-gun-control-wi_b_7627412.html>

I support gun control, but these efforts are doomed and always have been--and not just because of the power of the NRA. **Guns are so enmeshed in American history, so much a part of our cultural DNA that there will never be truly meaningful gun control in the U.S**. Advocates of gun control don't seem to understand thatand don't seem to understand our founding national story. **Part of why we rebelled against the British was their attempt *to take away our guns*.** In 1774, the British only had 2,000 troops in heavily-armed and seething Boston, and the British response was to take control of the powder house, which meant that Bostonians wouldn't be able to use their guns. The British also started searching for guns and ammunition without warrants. And to suppress a rebellion against their rule, the British began effectively embargoing exportation of guns and ammunition to the Colonies. **The** very **first battles** **at**[**Lexington and Concord**](http://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/battles-of-lexington-and-concord) between Americans and the British **took place because British troops were coming to seize an American arms cache. So guns are right there at the founding of our nation--they're there before we had a flag, a Declaration of Independence, a government, a national anthem, before we had anything that truly united us. Guns, and holding on to our guns. If you don't understand that, you don't understand American history--**and why repeated efforts at gun control have failed so miserably and will continue to fail no matter how much anguish we suffer. Citing gun control in other countries is pointless, because no other country has our unique history with guns and what they mean to us. Tragedies like the one in Charleston will keep happening, and so will the calls for change--but our history can't be unmade.

#### Only by disarming the police will civilian armaments be effected. The police and elites must be disarmed for future change. We need a cultural change within the mindset of guns in America but that does not happen unless we include the police in our disarmament.

James B. **Jacobs 1—86** (“Exceptions to the General Prohibition on Handguns: Do They Swallow Up the Rule?*” Law and Contemporary Problems 49* (1986):5-35.

**The best that can be hoped for is** slowly **to change societal attitudes about** the necessity and usefulness of **guns.** **This change cannot be accomplished without** strong leadership from **the police** **and** the **elite** sectors **of society.** **As long as the police**, who are so visible, **operate under the assumption that firearms are essential for their safety and security, there is no prospect for** substantial **reduction in civilian armaments**. 94 **The rest of the population will take its cue from the police** and the private security sector, **reinforcing its belief that firearms are essential to personal** and household **security** (34).

#### Handgun only exemptions amplify social discontent with gun controls. We must include the police and other law agents for societal compliance.

James B. **Jacobs 2—86** (“Exceptions to the General Prohibition on Handguns: Do They Swallow Up the Rule?*” Law and Contemporary Problems 49* (1986):5-35

Most gun control proposals put forward in the last few years are not likely to be perceived as fair because they explicitly and implicitly recognize the value and importance of gun ownership by carving out gaping exceptions to a general gun prohibition. Close examination reveals that **many prohibitionists are not advocating "total disarmament."** To begin with, **practically all "control" scenarios seek to prohibit only "handguns," leaving people free to own rifles, shotguns, and other long guns**. Some scenarios would ban only "Saturday Night Specials,' 7 leaving people free to own more expensive and powerful handguns as well as long guns. **Nor do handgun-only prohibitionists mean to eliminate all handgun ownership; exceptions are** invariably **made for persons judged to** have good reasons for **own**ing **or carry**ing **handguns. Police,** private security guards, private investigators, business persons, and selected individuals **are** typically **exempted from handgun bans.** These categorical exceptions raise profound and politically volatile equity concerns. **As more people fall within the exceptions, there is less moral force behind the prohibition; the exceptions reinforce the** apparently **widely held feeling that handguns are** valuable, even **necessary, for personal security. Even a small number of broad exceptions might discourage people from voluntarily discarding their handguns, or** from **cooperating with a prohibition law**. (6-7).

#### Exemptions in handgun bans only strength insurrectionists and fringe anti-government groups.

James B. **Jacobs 3—86** (“Exceptions to the General Prohibition on Handguns: Do They Swallow Up the Rule?*” Law and Contemporary Problems 49* (1986):5-35.

**If special vulnerability to victimization justifies exemption from a handgun prohibition, there are many** subgroups and countless **individuals whose claims would be stronger than those of prison guards, probation and parole officers, and judges and court personnel**. Similarly, if the crucial justificatory criterion is special reliability, there are numerous groups and countless individuals whose claim is as strong. **As the police exception expands to embrace all sorts of public officials, more private citizens will doubt the equity of the prohibition.** Moreover, **a handgun prohibition which leaves large numbers of government employees armed will be anathema to those people who tend to distrust government and governmental elites** (26).

#### Its empirically proven handgun prohibitions only work when you include, not exempt, police and security forces.

David **Kopel—1993** (“Peril or Protection: The Risks and Benefits of Handgun Prohibition”, Saint Louis University Public Law Review 12.2 (1993):285-356

In sum, one of the reasons that **severe handgun controls have been** partially **successful in reducing handgun possession in Japan, Great Britain, and Canada**, **is that the police** in -each nation **have, to** varying degrees**, minimize**d possession and/or **use of handguns themselves**; **the examples set by the police and government may be an important reason why criminal and non-criminal civilians in those nations** have, to varying degrees, **voluntarily forego**ne **the use of handguns**. Accordingly, Dixon's proposal to allow police and security guards a broad exemption from his handgun prohibition may seriously undermine his proposal's chance for success**.** At the least, his proposal would need to be accompanied by drastic restrictions on the numbers of police authorized to carry guns, as well as major changes in the practices of police who do carry guns. (294).

#### Countries like Britain and New Zealand recognize that when police have a gun they are only worried about protecting their gun not the public.

Pamela **Engel** Why Cops In Britain And New Zealand Don’t Carry Guns Pamela Engel is a reporter for Business Insider's main page, covering mostly breaking news and crime. She previously worked for the Associated Press in Indianapolis and has also written for The Columbus Dispatch, the Scripps Howard news wire and the New York Observer. Pamela graduated from Ohio University with a bachelor's degree in journalism. November 5th, 20**14**

**Britain and New Zealand** have adopted an uncommon style of policing. Their **cops** typically **don't carry guns on the job.** You might assume this would lead to more officer fatalities, but [that's not the case](http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/08/armed-police). **In Britain, this tradition stretches back to the 19th century. When the Metropolitan Police force was formed, people feared the military and wanted to avoid a police force that was oppressive**, [according to the BBC](http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19641398). **If police officers don't have guns, then they can't use firearms against citizens.** Moreover, police can't have their own guns used against them. By only allowing some officers to be armed — like a firearms unit in every police force in Britain and cops who patrol security-sensitive places like airports, for example — the logic goes, there's less of a risk of gun violence overall. A New Zealand police commissioner [wrote in an editorial in 2009](http://www.police.govt.nz/news/commissioners-blog/police-routinely-unarmed-my-watch): I have no doubt that **carrying handguns would compromise officers' ability to do their regular work, because when you carry a weapon, your primary concern is to protect that weapon. If this was balanced by a clearly demonstrable increase in personal protection, it would be a price to consider paying.** But **the protection offered by a firearm — particularly a pistol — is more illusory than real.** This has actually worked out quite well. **The UK and New Zealand** fare rather well compared to other countries when it comes to violent crime. They **have some of the lowest homicide rates in the world:** Police shootings are far less prevalent in Britain than they are in the US. In the wake of the Michael Brown shooting in August, The Economist [noted](http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/08/armed-police) that British citizens are about "100 times less likely to be shot by a police officer than Americans."

**Police privately own their guns**

**Sexton 06** (Jared Sexton, Professor at the University of California, Irvine “Race, Nation, and Empire in a Blackened World”. 251)

**In the United States, homegrown white supremacists, and the lion’s share of their more moderate neighbors, have long considered black people to be weapons of mass destruction**. Racial profiling, the hallmark of Homeland Security’s dreadful encroachments, cut its fearsome teeth several years prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Prior, as well, to the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) “Driving while Black” campaign in the late 1990s; prior to the launch of President Ronald Reagan’s infamous war on drugs in the early 1980s, and even to President Richard Nixon’s earlier consolidation of the first truly nationwide police apparatus in the late 1960s. In fact, the genealogy of this nefarious police practice is properly charted beyond the twentieth century, reaching back, with stunningly little modification, to the ethos of the colonial slave patrols of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Given this line of descent, it is not unreasonable to say that **racial profiling is the sine qua non of modern policing**. **In the consternated deliberations of national security, official and unofficial, from the founding of the republic to the trumpeting of the new world order, the social control and crisis management of the black population has always figured centrally, even or perhaps especially when matters of emancipation or racial equality have by no means enjoyed the focus of debate. Across the sweep of U.S. history, policing the color line has required no credible threat of invasion, no evidence of insurrectionary design, no proven stockpile of illicit chemical agents or radioactive material, no particular breach of domestic or international law, no sensational moral or ethical transgression** (though all of these items, real or imagined, have factored in the relevant discourses, public and private). **It has only required the presence — within the polity, economy, culture, and society — of a so-called problem people, dwelling as the absence of human presence.** We can note further that the institution of transatlantic racial slavery — whose political and economic relations constitute, present tense, the social fabric of Western modernity in general, of the Americas in particular, and of the United States most acutely — cannot be explained (away) by the acquisition of fixed capital, the minimization of variable capital, or the maximization of profits, much less by the dictates of gunboat diplomacy, the expansion of strategic overseas military installations, or the idiosyncrasies of the White House. It may seem so at times, but only insofar as contemporary observers, or our historical counterparts, fundamentally misrecognize the nature of racial slavery: as a brutal regime of labor exploitation; as the atrocious adjunct to land conquest and the extermination, containment, and/or forced assimilation of indigenous peoples; or as an endeavor functional to, rather than in excess of and at times at odds with, the advent and maturation of Eurocentric capitalism. Of course, all of these procedures have been important to the history of racial slavery (and vice versa), but none is essential to its origins, its development and, above all, its pernicious afterlife.1 Rather, **enslavement — the inaugural enterprise for the age of Europe,** the precondition for the American century and its coveted sequel — **is enabled by and dependent on** the most basic of operations: symbolic and material immobilization, **the absolute divestment of sovereignty at the site of the black body:** its freedom of movement, its conditions of labor, its physical and emotional sustenance, its social and sexual reproduction, its political and cultural representation. Beyond its economic utility, this **rendering of the black as the object of dispossession par excellence — object of accumulation, prototypical commodity, captive flesh — structures indelibly the historical proliferation of modern conceptions of sovereignty that now dominate political and legal discourse globally and provide the crucial frames of intelligibility for both imperialism and anti-imperialism, empire and its discontents.** With blacks barred by definition from the very notion of the sovereign (whatever their nominal legal status, wherever their tentative place of residence), those not marked by the material and symbolic stigma of slavery have the exclusive and positive capacity to debate about sovereignty: to trivialize its importance and rationalize its violation or to struggle in its defense, to name and lament its loss, and wage war for its recovery. **Blacks, then, suffer a peculiar relation to the U.S. empire in the historic instance**: **neither its subjects (certainly not its authors or beneficiaries) nor its objects (at least not in the most direct sense).** This peculiarity was underscored dramatically during the notorious U.S. war in Southeast Asia (1965 – 75) wherein black soldiers, overwhelmingly conscripted, were not only disproportionately offered up as cannon fodder (after long being segregated and retained in noncombat functions, depicted as cowardly and inept, denied access to the social capital of military heroism, etc. — all components of the typical critique of the racism internal to the armed forces) but were also differentiated by the enemies of the U.S. military invasion and occupation. Racially targeted propaganda appealed to the cruel ironies of black military service (ironies already well known and articulated by mid-century) and offered ideological support to the struggle for freedom, justice, and equality that was, at the time, intensifying and mutating stateside as it raised the galvanizing cry of Black Power. More important, I think, were the notable combat tactics of Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers, which frequently targeted white soldiers for ambush and sniper attacks while leaving unharmed (if at all possible) contingents of black soldiers on hand, a veritable racial partition of attack. In this circumscribed domain, the campaign of Vietnamese guerrilla fighters sought to exploit — in parts strategically, in parts earnestly — the living legacy of antiblackness among U.S. fighting forces not only by suggesting a political affinity between blacks and Asians as victims of white supremacy (whether European colonialism or U.S. imperialism) but also by enacting a displacement of the racially distributed vulnerability to violence that otherwise slated blacks for gratuitous assault without recourse. Muhammad Ali’s famous 1966 statement, “I ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet-Cong. No VietCong ever called me nigger,” takes on added weight in this light. Black troops, for their part, contributed actively to this antagonistic milieu with, among other things, hundreds of fraggings of white junior officers, the repeated refusal of high-risk assignments, and, on several occasions, open rebellion and riot against the system of overseas military policing and prisons in which they were, predictably, overrepresented as captives. In the contemporary theater of operations in occupied Iraq, this historical discrepancy — which has hardly been mitigated, even if it is newly mediated — promised to reassert itself briefly with the fragging incident involving U.S. Army Sergeant Asan Akbar, a native-born black.2 But **the racial politics of U.S. militarism**, so prominent at the height of black political movement and social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s, **have been consistently and unsurprisingly convoluted by the** combined effects of corporate media machinations and **the marked disarray of black politics domestically.3 The global antiwar movement**, while eloquent on the menace of the former, has missed the latter point almost entirely. In its drive for popular (if not populist) appeal, a drive **fueled by the euphoria of mass demonstrations** on the eve of the U.S. invasion, political opposition to the war on terror across the global North has **borrowed** freely **from the rhetorical repertoire of black freedom struggle** in and beyond the United States, **but** it **has displayed a striking disinterest in either the political energies or the lived experience of actually existing black communities.**

#### Thus, the Plan: The United States federal government should ban the private ownership of handguns.

Talking in cross ex:

Look our argument is that we advocate a different conception of privacy, its about legal sense and its also about

## Frontlines

### AT Regulations CP

#### 1. Does not solve the value orientation of the aff—curry 14 is an independent disad

#### 2. Permutation. Do the aff and put regulations on all other guns. NB is the aff

### AT Self-Defense DA

**For Criminals:**

#### 1.They have conceded the Dixon 93 evidence which takes out the internal link to their disad- the only reason people would need guns to defend themselves form criminals is if criminals were able to illegally get guns—the Dixon 93 evidence denies this because it says the which means criminals can only get illegal guns from people who still had to buy guns illegally banning guns banns the overall pool of guns but all the Fendrock 13 evidence proves if we kill the market that means there’s no handguns in production which makes it significantly less likely for a criminal to get a gun and reduces the need for self defense

**2.** **Self-defense is literally not even real when it comes to guns**

[Christopher **Ingraham**](http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/christopher-ingraham) June 19, 20**15** Guns in America: For every criminal killed in self-defense, 34 innocent people die Christopher Ingraham writes about politics, drug policy and all things data. He previously worked at the Brookings Institution and the Pew Research Center.

"The only way to stop a bad guy with a gun is with a good guy with a gun." [says](http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/12/21/nra-only-way-to-stop-a-bad-guy-with-a-gun-is-with-a-good-guy-with-a-gun/) Wayne LaPierre, the vice president of the National Rifle Association. [That's become the kernel](http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/12/21/nra-only-way-to-stop-a-bad-guy-with-a-gun-is-with-a-good-guy-with-a-gun/) of the NRA's response to recent mass shooting tragedies -- if only more people carried guns for protection, the thinking goes, then they would be less likely to be victimized by gun-wielding criminals. “The only way to stop a bad guy with a gun is with a good guy with a gun,” LaPierre said The challenge to that argument is that, data show, **guns are rarely used in self-defense** -- especially relative to the rate at which they're used in criminal homicides or suicides. A recent [report from **the Violence Policy Center**](http://www.vpc.org/studies/justifiable15.pdf), a gun control advocacy group, **put** those **numbers in** some **perspective**, and I dug up the raw numbers from the FBI's homicide data. Take a look: **In 2012, there were**[**8,855 criminal gun homicides**](https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2008-2012.xls)**in the FBI's homicide database, but only**[**258 gun killings by private citizens that were deemed justifiable**](https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_15_justifiable_homicide_by_weapon_private_citizen_2008-2012.xls)**, which the FBI defines as "the killing of a felon, during the commission of a felony, by a private citizen." That works out to one justifiable gun death for every 34 unjustifiable gun deaths.** Or, look at it this way. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data shows that **in 2012 there were 20,666 suicides by gun. That works out to one self-defense killing for every 78 gun suicides**. CDC data show that there were more than twice as many accidental gun fatalities as justifiable killings. There are, of course, plenty of solid arguments for robust 2nd Amendment protections. Millions of people use guns for sport and recreation every day. The vast majority of gun owners are responsible citizens, not criminals. But, though some people certainly use guns for self-defense, the data suggest that **overall, guns are used far more often for killing than self-defense**. As a result, it may be worth thinking twice about arguments for more guns in schools, churches and other public places.

#### 2. TURN. Notions of self-defense are rooted within the individuality concepts in traditional American democracy.

**To Women:**

**1. Guns do absolutely nothing—if a women is about to be raped she is already being taken control of—C/A the Ingraham 15 evidence—their evidence is just that handguns would help whereas we give stats saying hey they really don’t do anything**

**2. Our aff solves—c/a the value orientation Dixon and O’brien evidence, by banning guns we challenge the pervasive culture of gun violence in America—this violence has manifested itself through masculine norms banning handguns changllenges this masculintity which means in terms of impact weighing we have terminal defense that handguns do nothing to self defend and have a big ass reason why CHANGIN VALUES AND CULTURE WITHIN SOCIETY solves the link to the disad**

**3. Link turn- the representations of her disad is transphobic and racist as hell. Why is the link only to women, as if they are the only bodies affected by rape violence? Yes it’s a link of omission but it’s pretty damning because it’s this same logic that allows us to continue the myth of the black male rapist or that rape doesn’t manifest itself onto trans bodies.**

#### AND- Background checks like the 1AC don’t solve

Amnesty International September 2005: Amnesty International [Non-governmental organisation focused on human rights with over 7 million members and supporters around the world] “The impact of Guns on Women’s Lives” Amnesty International Publications

US research shows that prior domestic violence in the household makes a woman **In most countries the law bans people with** *serious* ***criminal convictions* from buying** or carrying **guns**. This usually means that when a person applies for a gun licence or tries to buy a gun, their criminal record is checked. However, **such checks on their own are inadequate to stop abusive partners from acquiring guns because domestic violence so rarely results in convictions** for a serious criminal offence. **A vital part of overcoming the poor conviction rates is the existence of a criminal justice system that encourages women to report violence** in the home, provides support for them when they do, and treats domestic violence as a serious offence. **The reality is that in many countries women do not report violence in the home. Some are too fearful of their abusers** to report them, others lack access to the police or justice system while others feel there is little point in reporting crimes which will not be taken seriously. A successful programme to stop gun violence in the home needs to address these wider issues of discrimination and violence against women. Increasingly, countries are introducing restrictions to prevent gun licences being given to people who have had a *domestic violence protection order* issued against them. For example, the new Firearms Control Act in South Africa, which came into force in July 2004, specifies that a gun licence will be refused to anyone with a record of violence, including domestic violence. Similarly, US federal law makes gun possession illegal for abusive husbands or partners who are subject to a restraining order or who have been convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanour. protect women, its **effectiveness is undermined because criminal records are the responsibility of state governments and many states do not enter details** of convictions for violence in the home into the federal database. A further loophole that allows convicted criminals to acquire guns is that the federal law does not require any background checks to be made if the purchase is being made from an individual rather than from a federally licensed dealer. While some states have

#### AND, Self-defense is a concept used to justify white supremacist anxiety. The erosion of whites’ demographic advantage has led many whites to rationalize aggression and self-defense as the basis of their racial subjectivity.

Chad **Kautzer---2015** (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado Denver “Good Guys with Guns: From Popular Sovereignty to Self-Defensive Subjectivity” *Law Critique* (2015) 26:173-187)

In my introductory remarks, I stated that **self-defensive subjects undermine the social conditions of their own freedom, and are unable to understand the origin and function of abstract rights within an informal normative order. These objective and subjective conditions result from the passionate attachment to, or unmediated identification with, the abstract right of self-defense in particular. It is the right to self-defense and, more specifically, the Constitutional right to bear arms that takes precedence here**-rather than, for example, the right to private property-due to the real or perceived withdrawal of state support for the informal relations of rule that reproduce raced and gendered identities. All categories of violent crime have been on the decline in the United States for over 25 years, so crime statistics and legislative agendas are inversely related, raising the question: why are we now experiencing what Suk called an 'epochal transformation' in self-defense (and why is it predominantly white men who are promoting it)? What is giving rise to the new techniques and tactics of domination deployed?

**The white demographic in the United States is in decline and projected to lose its majority status in less than 30 years.** This tendency, together **with gains in social, economic and political power by women and racial minorities in the United States over the past 50 years-personified by the first black president sworn into office in 2008-has contributed to a profound and widespread condition of white anxiety.** The state is inevitably reducing the 'public and psychological wage' of whiteness about which Du Bois spoke, albeit in fits and starts. This represents the loss of the very foundation of white identity, particularly among poor and working-class whites, and as Wendy Brown notes, 'aggression is what emerges in the space of unmourned losses' (Brown 2006, p. 31). Indeed, this is a stubborn, agitated and aggressive form of subjectivity, perpetually suspicious and perceiving threats all around. For this reason, Hegel's description of the pathologies of legal freedom arising from normative indeterminacy, rather than Honneth's, is more fitting (Honneth 2000, 2010, 2014). [184]

### AT Gun Laws Racist

#### Not unique

We change values which are better

Not a ban—maybe regulation not prohibition

[Phoebe Maltz **Bovy**](https://newrepublic.com/authors/phoebe-maltz-bovy) December 10, 20**15** *It’s Time to Ban Guns. Yes, All of Them*  Phoebe Maltz Bovy is a writer living in Toronto. She is writing a book with St. Martin’s Press about the idea of privilege (2017).

**These, however, are criticisms of certain tentative, insufficient gun control measures—the ones that would leave small-town white families with legally-acquired guns well enough alone, allowing them to shoot themselves or one another and to let their guns enter the general population. Ban Guns, meanwhile, is not discriminatory in this way. It’s not about dividing society into**[**“good” and “bad”**](http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/why-good-guys-with-guns-wont-keep-us-safe/)**gun owners. It’s about placing gun ownership *itself*in the “bad” category.** It’s worth adding that the anti-gun position is ultimately about police not carrying guns, either. That could never happen, right? Well, certainly not if we keep on insisting on its impossibility. Ask yourself this**: Is the pro-gun side concerned with how *it*comes across? More to the point: Does the fact that someone opposes gun control demonstrate that they’re culturally sensitive to the concerns of small-town whites, as well as deeply committed to fighting police brutality against blacks nationwide? I’m going to go with *no*and *no*on these. (The NRA exists!) On the pro-gun-control side of things, there’s far too much timidity. What’s needed to stop all gun violence is a vocal *ban guns* contingent. Getting bogged down in discussions of what’s feasible keeps what needs to happen—*no more guns*—from entering the realm of possibility. Public opinion needs to shift. The no-guns stance needs to be an identifiable place on the spectrum,**

### AT CJS DA

#### Won’t pass

[Clare **Foran**](Clare%20Foran) JAN 12, 20**16** <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/criminal-justice-reform-obama/423789/> A New Hurdle in the Push for Criminal-Justice Reform A disagreement between a House Republican and the Obama administration creates a challenge.

**Even with** that **common ground,** however, **tensions are bubbling up.** **A debate over the burden of proof for criminal convictions now threatens to throw a wrench into the effort to overhaul the nation’s criminal-justice system.** That debate was on full display Tuesday during [a conversation](http://www.theatlantic.com/live/events/atlantic-exchange-sotu2016/2016/) between House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte and *The Atlantic’s*Washington Editor-at-Large Steve Clemons at an*Atlantic Exchange* event. **The Republican chairman suggested that the House of Representatives won’t approve a criminal-justice deal without changes to the way the U.S. criminal code determines criminal intent**, despite the fact that the White House opposes the changes. “A deal that does not address this issue is not going anywhere in the House of Representatives,” Goodlatte said when asked if he would oppose a deal that did not include such a provision. “It has to be overcome. This is a critical element to doing justice in this country.” **The disagreement points to the possibility that negotiations will break down. It** highlights the **challenges**, and potential pitfalls, of assembling **a left-right coalition**, and raises the question of how much various interests at play will be willing to compromise. The dispute also threatens to stall sentencing reform, an issue that the president has elevated as a top priority in his second-term. At stake is a question of fairness. Goodlatte, along with conservative and libertarian organizations, support legal changes that they say would protect citizens from being unfairly charged with crimes they unknowingly committed. The White House, along with liberal organizations, believe that altering the burden of proof could make it more difficult to prosecute criminal activity. Critics also fear the proposal could let big business off the hook for illicit activities that lawyers could claim a company didn’t know were illegal.

AT Economic collapse impact:

1. These impacts don’t link to the framework of the aff which is changing cultural values

2. the economy is bad because of culture

3. good nra has too much power—economic collapse checks their power—SOLVES your link

#### Political capital’s irrelevant and winners win

Hirsch 2013, 2-7-13. Michael Hirsh “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital.” chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. [http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207]

The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

#### PC Fails and winners win

Mann and Ornstein 13 (Thomas E Mann, PhD in political science, senior fellow of governance studies at the Brookings Institute, former professor at Princeton, JHU, Georgetown, UVirginia, and American University, Norm Ornstein, founder of political capital theory, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, PhD from the University of Michigan, member of the Advisory Board of the Future of American Democracy Foundation, serves on the Advisory Board of the Institute for Law and Politics at the University of Minnesota Law School, member of the Board of Directors of the nonpartisan election reform group Why Tuesday?, one of Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers of 2012, “Mann and Ornstein: “Brighter future for politics and policy requires a different Republican Party”” <http://www.salon.com/2013/09/14/mann_and_ornstein_brighter_future_for_politics_and_policy_requires_a_different_republican_party/>) gz

The year that has passed since this book first appeared has done nothing to make us question our analysis of the causes of America’s dysfunctional politics. First, today’s sharply polarized and strategically focused political parties fit poorly with a constitutional system that anticipates collaboration as well as competition within and across separated institutions. As we initially wrote, parliamentary-style parties in a separation-of-powers government are a formula for willful obstruction and policy irresolution. The continuation of divided party government and the promiscuous use of the filibuster after the 2012 election have largely frustrated the policy direction affirmed by majority electorates and supported in polls of voters taken since the election.¶ Second, the Republican Party continues to demonstrate that it is an insurgent force in our politics, one that aspires to rewrite the social contract and role of government developed and affirmed over a century by both major political parties. The old conservative GOP has been transformed into a party beholden to ideological zealots, one that sees little need to balance individualism with community, freedom with equality, markets with regulation, state with national power, or policy commitments with respect for facts, evidence, science, and a willingness to compromise.¶ These two factors—asymmetric polarization and the mismatch between our parties and governing institutions—continue to account for the major share of our governing problems. But the media continues, for the most part, to miss this story. A good example was the flurry of coverage in the early months of the 113th Congress based on or at best testing the proposition that policymaking failures could be attributed to the failures of Obama’s presidential leadership. Bob Woodward may have started the pack journalism with his conclusion that President Obama, unlike his predecessors Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, “failed to work his will on Congress” (whatever that means). Soon the critical question to be parsed by the press was whether elements of Obama’s personality (aloofness) or strategic decisions on how and when to engage members of Congress, especially Republicans, accounted for the failure to reach bipartisan consensus. Republicans were delighted to provide commentary on behalf of the affirmative: “he doesn’t call us, meet with us, invite us to the White House, listen to our views, understand where we are coming from, etc.” The drumbeat from the press eventually led Obama to respond. He hosted a dinner with a dozen Republican senators at The Jefferson, lunch with Paul Ryan at the White House, and then a second dinner with another group of Republican senators. He also made trips to Capitol Hill to meet separately with both Republican conferences and Democratic caucuses. Initial reactions from participants were favorable, but it wasn’t long before reporters wondered if the president’s “charm offense” was failing.¶ The framing of this question reveals much about the state of American politics and media commentary on dysfunctional government. Presidential leadership is contextual—shaped by our unique constitutional arrangements and the electoral, partisan, and institutional constraints that flow from and interact with them. Under present conditions of deep ideological polarization of the parties, rough parity between Democrats and Republicans that fuels a strategic hyperpartisanship, and divided party government, opportunities for bipartisan coalitions on controversial policies are severely limited. Constraints on presidential leadership today are exacerbated by the relentlessly oppositional stance taken by the Republicans since Obama’s initial election, their continuing embrace of Grover Norquist’s “no new tax” pledge, and their willingness since gaining the House majority in 2011 to use a series of manufactured crises to impose their policy preferences on the Democrats with whom they share power. Persuasion matters if the people you are trying to persuade have any inclination to go along, or any attachment to the concept of compromise. But if a mythical magician could create a president from the combined DNA of FDR, LBJ, Tip O’Neill, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, the resulting super-president would be no more successful at charming or working his will in this context.¶ Ironically, Obama made great efforts to work cooperatively with Republicans during his first term. He learned painfully that his public embrace of a policy virtually ensures Republican opposition and that intensive negotiations with Republican leaders are likely to lead to a dead end. No bourbon-and-branch-water-laced meetings with Republicans in Congress or preemptive compromises with them will induce cooperative behavior. The scope for presidential leadership is limited, and based not on naïveté about the opposition he faces but on a hard-headed determination to make some cooperation in the electoral interests of enough Republicans to break the “taxes are off the table” logjam and move forward with an economic agenda that makes sense to most nonpartisan analysts and most Americans.

#### Winners win – rallies public support

Scher 12/29 (2014, Bill, executive editor of LiberalOasis and RealClearPolitics contributor, “Obama's Poll Bump Is a Message for Republicans,” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2014/12/29/obamas_poll_bump_is_a_message_for_republicans_125082.html>)

After a lame-duck period in which we’ve seen a Cuba thaw, a China climate deal, and an undocumented immigrant reprieve, President Obama was awarded with his highest approval ratings in many months. His popularity has ticked up since November, with young voters, women and—most notably—independents accounting for the boost. “How can this be?” Republicans must be wondering. They just seized the Senate with a campaign based on little else but attacking incumbent Democrats for voting with Obama. Why are Americans rewarding him now? It’s a question Republicans should think long and hard about before they fully take over Congress next week. Obama’s increased popularity is a reminder that voters did not rebuff him in November solely on ideological grounds, but also out of frustration with a dysfunctional Washington unable to address long-standing national problems. When Obama is seen blowing through the roadblocks, that frustration dissipates. Successful Republican campaigns in swing states captured the frustrated mood of the electorate. When Colorado’s Cory Gardner attacked Sen. Mark Udall’s partisanship, he focused not on criticism of Democratic positions but on his own pledge to get things done in a bipartisan fashion. “When my party is wrong, I’ll say it,” Gardner vowed. “When something is broken, I’ll fix it.” Similarly, North Carolina’s Thom Tillis parried attacks on his state legislative record by assuring voters, “I worked with both parties” to raise education spending. Bipartisanship was not sold as an end in itself, but a means to making government work. In turn, when Obama gets things done, it doesn’t behoove Republicans to complain that he’s not being bipartisan enough. It puts pressure on Republicans to prove they want to get things done too. If the election results were, as Republicans claim, a message delivered to the White House, then the post-election public response is another message to Capitol Hill. Incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who overcame being caricatured by Democrats as the face of Washington dysfunction to win re-election, seems to grasp the public mood. In an interview with Roll Call, McConnell said he detected two separate messages from voters. “People were mad as hell at the president,” he said. “Our new members were also hearing—and I was hearing as well—that people didn’t like the fact that the Congress was dysfunctional. … That’s going to change.” But when McConnell talks about change, he mainly discusses tinkering with Senate procedures. He’s mentioned having committees take the lead in shaping legislation, allowing senators to propose more floor amendments, pursuing individual appropriations bills instead of omnibus bills and continuing resolutions. None of these changes, in and of themselves, guarantees that Congress and the White House will become partners in functionality. Committee squabbling, “poison pill” amendments, and general ideological inflexibility could still mean that, despite McConnell’s best intentions, the Senate remains a legislative sinkhole. More worrisome, when McConnell talks about his policy agenda, is that he offers little to suggest he comprehends the voters’ larger message about effective cooperation. “We certainly will have a vote on proceeding to a bill to repeal Obamacare,” he promises, as if that wouldn’t be the epitome of grandstanding over governing. Acknowledging that Obama will never sign a repeal, he insists, “We will go at that law … in every way that we can," including attempts to repeal the law’s linchpin, the individual mandate. This is hardly thoughtful reform designed to make the nation’s health care system work better, but a ham-fisted attempt to mangle the law beyond recognition and send us back to square one. Likewise, his claims about turning the appropriations process into a model of efficiency are undermined by his promise to use the bills that keep the government open for riders that would “rein in” Obama’s regulatory powers. Specifically, McConnell wants to attach prohibitions on the Environmental Protection Agency that would thwart, in his words, Obama’s “crusade on CO2 emissions.” In other words, McConnell wants to stop Obama from trying to solve the problem of climate change. The first vote the new majority leader plans to schedule is a bill to override the executive branch’s authority regarding the Keystone oil pipeline. On its face, this would be a bill designed to do something instead of blocking something. But the choice of Keystone is a strange issue to prioritize. Plunging domestic gasoline prices hardly make bringing Canadian tar sands oil to the world market an urgent matter. Furthermore, it’s not clear McConnell wants a bill that will become law or another vehicle for partisan combat, since the legislation appears headed for a presidential veto. McConnell’s insistence on a freewheeling amendment process means that the measure could become another vehicle for anti-Obama poison pills. Even if the bill stays “clean,” Obama has repeatedly said a decision on Keystone should wait until the Nebraska Supreme Court rules on whether the state can use eminent domain to run the pipeline through private land. Instead of beginning on an antagonistic note by trying to jam Obama, McConnell could wait until the court rules, assess the White House response, and perhaps pursue a compromise if the president remains resistant—before embarking on contentious legislation. Despite their recent victory, Republicans enter 2015 with two disadvantages. Obama has an agenda in hand that his bureaucracy has been diligently pursuing for years, while Republicans chose not to run this year on a unified platform because their factions don’t agree on policy specifics. And the president can act unilaterally and accomplish things, while Republicans can’t accomplish anything without Obama’s consent or without enough Democrats to forge a veto-proof majority.

#### Winners win—generates capital and wrecks the opposition.

**Daily Kos, 1-26** (“On Done Deals, Or, Sometimes Losing Is How You Win” 2011, google)

Right off the bat, you might be surprised how often you can win, even when you did not think you would; the fights over DADT and Elizabeth Warren's nomination are a couple of recent examples that come to mind. Beyond that, losing a political fight, and doing it well, helps to move the conversation incrementally over the longer term; I would suggest that it took two political cycles before the tide turned on the war in Iraq, and now it's beginning to look like the military's plan for "Victory In Afghanistan Through Massive Force" is a proposition that's tougher and tougher to sell every day-even within the White House. Conservatives know this well, and efforts to advocate for gun rights, to advance "pro-life" policies, and to radically change the form and function of government have extended over decades, with incremental changes often being the incremental goal ("let's create these temporary tax cuts today...and let's try to extend them forever another day..."). Ironically, another good reason to "fight the good fight", even in an environment where you might not see victory as possible, is one that is very familiar to the most fervent of Obama's '08 supporters: the very fight, in and of itself, is often a way to create political capital-even if you lose. How many of us have wished this very President would have stood up and fought for things that he might not have thought he would get? Would you support this President more if he had demanded that Congress pass a single-payer plan, or if he was pushing harder to end renditions and close Guantanamo, even if Congress was blocking him? I bet you would. And it makes sense: if you support single-payer, and you see someone out there fighting hard for the idea...that's a good thing, and that's someone you're likely to come back and support later. It worked for three Congressional Democrats who lost elections this fall: Feingold, Grayson, and Patrick Murphy are all in a great position to seek support from the very people who are the most frustrated with pretty much all the other Democrats today. Some of those supporters aren't even waiting for the future candidates; the "Draft Feingold for President" movement goes back to at least 2004, Grayson and Murphy also have supporters ready and willing to go. So...if it's true that if this President would fight like Bernie Sanders, even in a losing cause, then we would treat him with the same degree of affection and respect we feel toward Bernie Sanders...is it also true that we should, maybe, apply that lesson to ourselves? There is an argument to be made that trying to move your opponent when you don't think you can, and in the process showing how they appear to be either intransigent, or ignorant, or corrupt by comparison...or just plain wrong about something...can regularly end up moving voters, instead-and that the result of that movement is that your opponent sometimes has to move your way as well. I would submit that the 2005 effort to "reform" Social Security, when we had a Republican President, House, and Senate, went exactly nowhere fast because being wrong did move a bunch of voters to say...well, to say that all those Republicans were wrong. So there you go, folks: I'm here today to suggest that, even when we might not feel we have a good chance of winning a political fight-or even a fair chance-you still have to get out and fight the fight, if only to advance the cause for another day. It's also a great way to accrue political capital that can be used to your advantage later-and if the resistance from the other side is perceived as being too heavy-handed, they can suffer (OOTC:WLVTQ) from a sort of "attrition", as their own political capital is diminished. And even if you lose, there's still a lot to be gained in the effort, although you might not see the results until further down the road. As we said at the top of the story, there are lots of battles left over, including what is going to happen to Social Security and the potential for reforming Senate rules; but win or lose, it's probably a better idea to be trying to fight these fights, loudly and logically, just as we wish the President would, then to find ourselves hanging back and doing nothing at all today...and then voting for Jack Box for President 2012 as a way of expressing our frustration.

#### Winners win- even if capital is finite he can increase it

Singer, 2009 (Jonathan Singer, JD candidate at Berkeley and editor of MyDD, April 3, 2009, google)

Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame the Obama administration. So at this point, with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his ambitious actions and the Republicans sinking further and further as a result of their knee-jerked opposition to that agenda, there appears to be no reason not to push forward on anything from universal healthcare to energy reform to ending the war in Iraq.

#### Capital is replenished quickly—legislative success overwhelms controversy.

Mitchell, 2009 (Lincoln Mitchell, Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia University, “Time for Obama to Start Spending Political Capital” June 18, google)

Throughout his presidential campaign, but more notably, during his presidency, President Obama has shown himself to have an impressive ability to accumulate political capital. During his tenure in the White House, Obama has done this by reaching out to a range of constituencies, moderating some of his programs, pursuing middle of the road approaches on key foreign policy questions and, not insignificantly, working to ensure that his approval rating remains quite high. Political capital is not, however, like money, it cannot be saved up interminably while its owner waits for the right moment to spend it. Political capital has a shelf life, and often not a very long one. If it is not used relatively quickly, it dissipates and becomes useless to its owner. This is the moment in which Obama, who has spent the first few months of his presidency diligently accumulating political capital, now finds himself. The next few months will be a key time for Obama. If Obama does not spend this political capital during the next months, it will likely be gone by the New Year anyway. Much of what President Obama has done in his first six months or so in office has been designed to build political capital, interestingly he has sought to build this capital from both domestic and foreign sources. He has done this by traveling extensively, reintroducing to America to foreign audiences and by a governance style that has very cleverly succeeded in pushing his political opponents to the fringes. This tactic was displayed during the effort to pass the stimulus package as Republican opposition was relegated to a loud and annoying, but largely irrelevant, distraction. Building political capital was, or should have been, a major goal of Obama's recent speech in Cairo as well. Significantly, Obama has yet to spend any of his political capital by meaningfully taking on any powerful interests. He declined to take Wall Street on regarding the financial crisis, has prepared to, but not yet fully, challenged the power of the AMA or the insurance companies, nor has he really confronted any important Democratic Party groups such as organized labor. This strategy, however, will not be fruitful for much longer. There are now some very clear issues where Obama should be spending political capital. The most obvious of these is health care. The battle for health care reform will be a major defining issue, not just for the Obama presidency, but for American society over the next decades. It is imperative that Obama push for the best and most comprehensive health care reform possible. This will likely mean not just a bruising legislative battle, but one that will pit powerful interests, not just angry Republican ideologues, against the President. The legislative struggle will also pull many Democrats between the President and powerful interest groups. Obama must make it clear that there will be an enormous political cost which Democrats who vote against the bill will have to pay. Before any bill is voted upon, however, is perhaps an even more critical time as pressure from insurance groups, business groups and doctors organizations will be brought to bear both on congress, but also on the administration as it works with congress to craft the legislation. This is not the time when the administration must focus on making friends and being liked, but on standing their ground and getting a strong and inclusive health care reform bill. Obama will have to take a similar approach to any other major domestic legislation as well. This is, of course, the way the presidency has worked for decades. Obama is in an unusual situation because a similar dynamic is at work at the international level. A major part of Obama's first six months in office have involved pursuing a foreign policy that implicitly has sought to rebuild both the image of the US abroad, but also American political capital. It is less clear how Obama can use this capital, but now is the time to use it. A cynical interpretation of the choice facing Obama is that he can remain popular or he can have legislative and other policy accomplishments, but this interpretation would be wrong. By early 2010, Obama, and his party will, fairly or not, be increasingly judged by what they have accomplished in office, not by how deftly they have handled political challenges. Therefore, the only way he can remain popular and get new political capital is through converting his current political capital into concrete legislative accomplishments. Health care will be the first and very likely most important, test.

#### PC Not key

Siewert ’14 [Markus. Prof Poli Sci Goethe University (Germany). “WHEN POTUS DOES (NOT) GET WHAT HE WANTS – A FUZZY-SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF LEGISLATION” August 2014, SSRN]

The fortunes of the president in the legislative arena are in large parts determined by the political context in Congress (seminal works are Edwards 1989; Bond/Fleisher 1990; Peterson 1990). Party control in Congress is one – if not the main – single explanatory factor for the level of presidential legislative success. Presidents receive more of what they want under the condition of unified government than under divided party control of the branches of government mainly due to the fact that electoral incentives and policy goals overlap to a greater extent between the president and his own party in Congress compared to the opposition party (Rudalevige 2002; Barrett 2005; Barrett/Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Beckmann 2010). Because of that the president should be able to draw more support for his legislative agenda from his fellow partisans than from the other side of the aisle. Furthermore, the flow of information, the coordination of legislative tactics and strategies and the wheeling and dealing in negotiations on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue is much easier and smoother within the same partisan camp than across party lines (Beckmann 2008). But not only do the numbers of co-partisans matter; so does the majority party status itself. The majority party controls the procedural rules within both chambers of Congress – even though the supermajoritarian and individualistic nature of the Senate limits the powers of the majority party (Aldrich/Rohde 2000; Monroe et al. 2008). The powers of the majority party enable their leadership to steer the legislative process via the allocation of agenda space, through the assignment to committees or via setting the rules for final votes. On the one hand, this makes the congressional leadership a strong ally to the president that can guard the president’s legislative preferences at different stages of legislation. Under divided government, on the other hand, the majority leadership becomes a powerful opponent to the president that can hinder his legislative agenda in manifold ways (Edwards/Barrett 2000; Sinclair 2013; Covington et al. 1995).¶ Another contextual factor that shapes the president’s success on the substance of legislation is the distribution of ideological preferences in Congress. Over the last decades, parties in Congress have increasingly polarized; this means, on the one hand, that they have become internally more ideologically homogeneous, and on the other hand, ideologically diverged further apart from each other (Aldrich/Rohde 2000; Theriault 2008). Both the inter-party dimension as well as the intra-party dimension impact the president’s position in the legislative arena. First, with congressional parties ideologically drifting apart, it is more difficult to find common ground on policy issues, which also affects the president’s odds to score on the substance of legislation. The wider the ideological space between the president, pivotal legislators and party leaders in Congress, the more concessions he has to make on his legislative preferences (Rudalevige 2002; Beckmann 2010; Villalobos 2013). Second, the process of intra-party homogenization triggers the disappearance of cross-pressured and moderate members of Congress leading to greater unity within both parties. Especially in times of divided government moderates from the other party are the first contact points for the White House as partners for bargaining, log-rolling and horse-trading. As a consequence if Congress and the presidency are controlled by two different parties the White House loses attractive targets for deal-making. On the other hand, the internal homogenization helps his party under unified government because the caucuses consist of fewer possible dissenters (Andres 2005; Fleisher/Bond 2004; Theriault 2003). However, the Senate’s supermajoritarian rules limit the positive effects polarized parties have on the position of the president in the legislative arena. Regardless of unified government or divided government usually 60 votes are needed to pass a bill in the Senate. Therefore, the positive effects of polarized parties in Congress unfold only if the majority of the president’s party approximates the filibuster threshold (Fleisher et al. 2012). Besides the partisan and ideological setting in Congress the president’s standing within the public is a third factor contributing to his legislative success. Although empirical findings on the effects of public support on presidential success are mixed, the Washingtonian political community – politicians and staffers in the White House and the Capitol, lobbyists and journalists – as well as the constituents in the country perceive public support as a decisive element of the president’s political capital. Especially on salient issues public approval of the president job performance serves as a cue for legislators. Theoretically, members in Congress are reluctant to vote against a popular president shying away from electoral consequences of their opposition. On the other side, if he ranks low in public support members in Congress are less prone to vote in accordance with him (for an overview see Edwards 2009b). High public approval ratings unfold their effects in combination with other factors like party and ideology. High presidential approval ratings affect first and foremost those legislators that are already inclined to support him either because they are members of the same party or they share the same ideological orientations. Beyond that members of Congress from contested districts – which likely also have a moderate ideological disposition – are receptive to presidential approval ratings (Canes-Wrone/de Marchi 2002; Bond et al. 2003; Lebo/O’Geen 2011; Edwards 2009a; Peterson 1990). Neustadt also points at the asymmetric effect of presidential support because his “popularity may not produce a Washington response but public disapproval hardens Washington’s resistance” (Neustadt 1991: 90). Party control, ideological proximity, and public support constitute the institutional and political environment of the legislative arena which is largely beyond the president’s control. Over the last years an academic consensus has emerged that party and ideology are the single most important parameters for the president while presidential factors only matter “at the margins” (seminal Edwards 1989; Fleisher/Bond 1990). This perspective contrasts with numbers of journalistic and anecdotic comments, and also with a large body of (historical) case studies which facilitate the narrative of presidents shaping their legislative fate via their special bargaining skills. While earlier studies focused on personal traits or the presidents’ reputation as skilled or unskilled (Lockerbie/Borelli 1989; Fleisher/Bond 1990; Rudalevige 2002, Greenstein 2009), a new strand of empirical research focuses on the question how presidents can strategically increase their success through their involvement during the legislative process. For example, they demonstrate that presidents are more successful if they prioritize issues (Peterson 1990, Edwards/Barrett 2000), and if they actively lobby legislators on Capitol Hill (Beckmann 2010; Beckmann/Kumar 2011a; Covington 1987). Additionally, presidents are more successful in the legislative arena if they go public on a given bill (Canes-Wrone 2001; Barrett 2004; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006). However, the necessity of presidential lobbying or going public strategies as well as their effects on his success on the substance of legislation varies with the political contexts. The presidents’ need to negotiate intensively with legislators or to speak out to the public is higher if he is confronted with less favorable political conditions than if he faces a positive environment in Congress (Kernell 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha/Miles 2011). Furthermore, we can theorize that both approaches unfold their effect in combination with high levels of public support for the president’s position (Canes-Wrone 2001).

#### PC is a myth

Norm Ornstein, PhD in political science and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 5-16-2013, “The Myth of Presidential Leadership” http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/washington-inside-out/the-myth-of-presidential-leadership-20130508

No one defined the agenda or negotiated more brilliantly than Reagan. Did he “work his will”? On almost every major issue, he had to make major compromises with Democrats, including five straight years with significant tax increases. But he was able to do it—as he was able to achieve a breakthrough on tax reform—because he had key Democrats willing to work with him and find those compromises. For Obama, we knew from the get-go that he had no Republicans willing to work with him. As Robert Draper pointed out in his book Do Not Ask What Good We Do, key GOP leaders such as Eric Cantor and Paul Ryan determined on inauguration eve in January 2009 that they would work to keep Obama and his congressional Democratic allies from getting any Republican votes for any of his priorities or initiatives. Schmoozing was not going to change that. Nor would arm-twisting. On the gun-control vote in the Senate, the press has focused on the four apostate Democrats who voted against the Manchin-Toomey plan, and the unwillingness of the White House to play hardball with Democrat Mark Begich of Alaska. But even if Obama had bludgeoned Begich and his three colleagues to vote for the plan, the Democrats would still have fallen short of the 60 votes that are now the routine hurdle in the Senate—because 41 of 45 Republicans voted no. And as Sen. Pat Toomey, R-Pa., has said, several did so just to deny Obama a victory

### AT Security K

#### This is abstract

#### Yes state will reaffirm itself, don’t defend ethicality of state, just that state the only thing that can change anything, curry 14

#### Other movements mean nothing

#### THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS INEVITABLY IMPORTANT – It is the only avenue in which we can break down the institutional effects of racism

#### FRANKLIN James B. Duke Professor Emeritus of History Duke University 1993

John Hope-1985-1992 was Professor of legal History in the Law School at Duke University; *THE COLOR LINE: Legacy for the Twenty First Century*; p. 73-74

We now live in an age when the role of government is inevitably important whether we are referring to preschool education in Seattle or the aircraft industry in that area, whether we are talking about welfare in Detroit or the creaky, wavering automotive industry there. What we need so desperately is the assumption of responsibility at the highest levels in the public and private sectors to make a strong pitch for the elimination of the uglier aspects of the color line so that we can have a healthier, happier, even gentler society. We need to appreciate the importance of legislation, judicial decisions, and executive orders in setting the stage for eliminating the color line. Without them it is not possible for individuals or groups of individuals, however dedicated, to make a good-faith and successful effort to eliminate the color line. Yet we cannot expect too much of these public efforts, important as they are. These public efforts must be combined with private efforts to promote mutual respect and a willingness to make judgments of others based on what they have done and can do, and not on who they are. If we can somehow teach ourselves these lessons in human relations, perhaps we can take the first feeble steps toward creating the kind of community about which some of our forebears spoke and wrote, and the kind of nation about which so many of us have dreamed but never realized

#### Policymaking discussion is better than micro political discussions when the policies attack values. Even if the policy doesn’t pass, the scholarship from how that policy can actually change values to those who the policies affect is the best discussion and as per our curry evidence- the most production

#### This discussion is not abstract it is rooted in practical reality of those who suffer from opression- dealing with material conditions good- state will always be bad- what can we do to change how the state operates

### AT Extinction

#### Non action lead to extinction

#### Assumes all lives equal in the status qou- this is false- extinction ideal theory- recognize injustices in the squo first

#### C/A Curry 14- extinction is an ideal theory that glosses over tangible policies we can sue in the status quo to change realities

#### The only way they can gain true access to util is by using extinction as a means for how we must use the utility of each person or else we risk extinction, however, The DEATH CULTURE posed by extinction has already ENDED the world for people of color, SURVIVAL AT ANY COST outweighs LIBERTY, PEACE and DIGNITY. People of color face NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST and GENOCIDE through their jobs, housing, schools, families and land. Someone MUST STAND UP and make the connection between Extinction, RACISM, SEXISM and IMPERIALISM.

**Omolade** a historian of black women for the past twenty years and an organizer in both the women’s and civil rights/black power movements 19**84**Barbara; Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust; WOMEN’S STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vaol. 12., No. 2, Teaching about Peace, War, and Women in the Military, Summer, p. 12; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4004305> City College Center for Worker Education in New York City

In April, 1979, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, **in a** general **nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World.** The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war, as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages. Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation’s crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people. And the housing of people of color throughout the world’s urban areas is already blighted and inhumane: families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets; even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. **For people of color, the world** as we knew it **ended centuries ago. Our world,** with its own languages, customs and ways**, ended. And we are** only now **beginning to see** with increasing clarity **that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for it, and rebuild it in our own image. The “death culture” we live in has convinced many to be more** concerned with death than with life, more **willing to demonstrate for “survival at any cost” than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity. Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism,** to **the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered. Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands.** As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists. We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people’s wars in China, in Cuba, in Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but the only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people. We wonder who will lead the battle for nuclear disarmament with the vigor and clarity that women of color have learned from participating in other struggles. Who will make the political links among racism, sexism, imperialism, cultural integrity, and nuclear arsenals and housing? Who will stand up?

### AT Wilderson

#### Paraontology

#### Link: Afro-pessimism traps Blackness within the pathology of the white unconscious destroying considerations of material existential resistance.

A. Afro-pessimism asserts an apriori pessimism justified only his utilization of disciplinary theories which are fixated upon the slave as a sign of Blackness and violence. This is categorical Blackness is trapped within the Lacanian imaginary and can never access the reality of lived Black experience because of the symbolic order assumed to be an adequate reflection of the world around us.

B. Afro-Pessimism overdetermines Blackness in a para-ontology that conflates the white pathologization of Blackness with the possibilities, lives, and experiences of Black people. Black Studies, the understanding Black life as lived Black experience, is a refutation of the Afro-Pessimist’s core assumption. Ontologizing Blackness destroys lived experience.

Fred Moten—professor of English at Duke University—2008 (Black Op, *PMLA* 123.5:1743-1747)

Finally, one might plan to continue to believe that there is such a thing as blackness and that blackness has an essence given in striated, ensemblic, authentic experience (however much a certain natural bend is amplified by the force of every kind of event, however productive such constant inconstancy of shape and form must be of new understandings of essence and experience). It is obvious (particularly after the recent lessons of Lindon Barrett, Herman Bennett, Daphne Brooks, Nahum Chandler, Denise Ferreira da Silva, Brent Edwards, Saidiya Hartman, Sharon Holland, and Achilles Mbembe, among others) that blackness has always emerged as nothing other than the richest possible combination of dispersion and permeability in and as the mass improvisation and protection of the very idea of the human. Thus, concern over the supposedly stultifying force of authenticity exerted by supposedly restrictive and narrow conceptions of blackness, or worry over the supposed intranational dominance of blackness broadly and unrigorously conceived (in ways that presuppose its strict biological limitation within an unlimited minoritarian field), or anxiety over the putatively intradiasporic hegemony of a certain mode of blackness (which presumes national as well as biological determinations that are continually over- and underdetermined) indexes some other trouble, which we would do well to investigate. Such investigation is best accompanied by vigilant remembrance of and commitment to the fact that blackness is present (as E. P. Thompson said of the English working class) at its own making and that all the people who are called black are given in and to that presence, which exceeds them (in an irrevocable, antenational combination of terror and enjoyment, longing and rejection, that Hartman, in particular, illuminates). Ultimately, the paraontological force that is transmitted in the long chain of life and death performances that are the concern of black studies is horribly misunderstood if it is understood as exclusive.

Everyone whom blackness claims, which is to say everyone, can claim blackness. That claim is neither the first nor the last anticipatory reorientation but is, rather, an irreducible element of the differentially repeating plane that intersects and animates the comparativist sphere.

In this regard, black studies might best be described as a location habitually lost and found within a moving tendency where one looks back and forth and wonders how utopia came to be submerged in the interstices and on the outskirts of the fierce and urgent now. The temporal paradox of optimism—that it is, on the one hand, a necessarily futurial attitude while being, on the other hand, in its proper Leibnizian formulation, an assertion of the necessity, rightness, and timelessness of the always already existing—resonates in the slim gap between analytic immersion and deictic reserve. This bitter earth is the best of all possible worlds, a fact that necessitates the renewed, reconstructed, realization of imaginative intensities that move through the opposition of voluntary secrecy and forced exposure in order to understand how the underground operates out in, and as, the open. What’s the relation between the limit and the open? Between blackness and the limit? Between a specific and materially redoubled finitude called blackness and the open? The new critical discourse on the relation between blackness and death has begun to approach these questions. That discourse reveals that optimism doesn’t require—indeed, it cannot persist within—the repression of that relation; rather, it always lives (which is to say, escapes) in the faithful, postfatal assertion of a right to refuse, in the prenatal instantiation of a collective negative tendency to differ, and in the resistance to the regulative powers that resistance, differing, and refusal call into being. The general insistence that we don’t mind leaving here is inseparable from the fact that it’s all right. Black optimism persists in thinking that we have what we need, that we can get there from here, that there’s nothing wrong with us or even, in this regard, with here, even as it also bears an obsession with why it is that difference calls the same, that resistance calls regulative power, into existence, thereby securing the simultaneously vicious and vacant enmity that characterizes here and now, forming and deforming us. However much trouble stays in mind and, therefore, in the light of a certain interest that the ones who are without interests have in making as much trouble as possible, there is cause for optimism as long as there is a need for optimism. Cause and need converge in the bent school or marginal church in which we gather together to be in the name of being otherwise.

#### Buying into the ontology of the slave condemns Black people to suffer the physical pain as animals. To ignore the living, interpreting, resisting, Black people standing beside the category of Blackness is to condemn them and their consciousness of themselves to just being things, and suffering, crying out in pain without anyone to see them as human and suffering.

Stephen N. Haymes—Associate Professor of Education at DePaul University—2005 (Pedagogy and the Philosophical Anthropology of African American Slave Culture, in Not Only the Masters Tools, 173-203,193-194).

Again, to suffer as a black slave is to have one’s black body seen by others and possibly oneself as a thing that is an absence of human experience. It is to be forced into the realm of property, whereby the slave’s cries for recognition go unheard because “he or she falls below the category of otherness, for an Other is another human being” (Gordon 2000a:223). Treated as an animal, the slave is presumed to be without human consciousness. Like an animal the slave is treated as if he or she has no self-consciousness, henceforth possessing no possibilities of the freedom to choose, to act, and to define oneself.

To be without human consciousness is to be incapable of bodily self-awareness and therefore, to be incapable of experiencing pain as a person who is conscious of being alive. Put another way, to experience pain as an absence of human presence in the world is to indifferent to life and its possibilities. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Freidrich Nietzsche maintains that suffering is the ground of moral life in that it draws our reflective attention upon the problems of living and, henceforth, on our human presence in the world. But, he says, “negroes…taken as representative of prehistoric man” (Nietzsche 1967: 67-68) are, in contrast to Europeans, not able to suffer because their constitution is such that Negroes are supposedly not capable of experiencing bodily pain (see also Preston 1997 and Kant as quoted in Eze 1997:116).

The question of bodily pain raises the distinction between corporeality and the lived body. A physical body is a body that is in-itself, a body that is a “thing,” in which case it is perceived as complete and fulfilled, and thus has no possibilities in that it is incapable of exercising freedom. Conversely, a lived body is a body for-itself; it has possibilities and is therefore a body with intentionality. Which is to say that the lived body is bound up with, and directed toward, an experienced world (see Leder 1990:75).

In an antiblack world the lived experience of the black is such that the black slave is conscious of his or her body through the perspective of the white world. Fanon notes, “In the white world the [black] encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity” (Fanon 1967b:110). This is a perspective that degrades the slave’s black body as a lived body. Hence, the pained body of the black slave is reduced merely to physiological sensation or to physical pain, making the painful existence of the slave qualitatively no different from the pain experienced by the nonhuman animal. This is in contrast to the fact that the human experience of pain is intricately bound up with the quest for meaning, legitimacy and understanding. Human pain, in other words, is not simply suffered; we are always compelled to make sense of it, in which case human pain is also subjective experience. Howard Thurman once wrote:

Because man has a mind and is in a very profound sense an experiencer of life, pain is something that is seen as happening to him. He is aware that this is happening to him. He knows that he hurts—its is a very local experience. Thus for man suffering is possible. For him the physical pain is interpreted; it is at this point that the crucial issue of all suffering arises. What does the pain mean? (Thurman 1998:43).

But to understand what pain meant to the slaves, we must understand how pain functions in relation to the lived body. For one thing, because pain hurts, it seizes our attention and forces reorientation of our whole being, hence pain, according to Drew Leder, is a “manner of being-in-world” (I.eder 1990: 73). By this, Leder means that pain disrupts the body’s relationship with the world; it forcibly “reorganizes our lived space and time, our relations with others and with ourselves (ibid). In short, pain disrupts the body’s processes of perception and therefore the body’s intentional movement toward and experienced world. The reason is that pain is experienced in the confines of one’s flesh and thus is marked by an interiority that another cannot share. Elaine Scarry notes that “when one speaks about one’s own physical pain and about another person’s physical pain, one might appear to be spoken about two wholly distinct orders of events. For the person whose pain it is, it is effortlessly grasped, while for persons outside the sufferer’s body, what is effortless is not grasping it” (Scarry 1985:4).

#### Decadence

#### I. The Neg asks us to simply trust narratives. Such moves discount evidence and reduce epistemology to the value we are demanded to place in our sympathies with the authority of the person. When “performing evidence” substitutes for evidence, the appearance of legitimacy dooms the pursuit of knowledge and propagates decadence. I’m not saying that the narrative is false but I’m indicting their epistemological viewpoint.

Lewis **Gordon 06**—professor at philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at University of Connecticut Storrs—2006 (*Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times*, p 28-29)

A striking feature (among many) of the contemporary intellectual climate, as I pointed out in the introduction of this book, is the war on evidence. There are many instances of this, but perhaps most memorable are the many "charts" and so-called evidential claims made by Ronald Reagan during his presidency. The so-called evidence he advanced was rarely ever evident. We needn’t blame Reagan for this. It was happening everywhere. Think of the scores of pseudo-intellectuals who have mastered the performance of “academese” and the rhetorical advance of evidence like claims. Lying beneath all this are, of course, nihilistic forces, and lying beneath such forces are, as Friedrich Nietzsche diagnosed little more than a century ago, decadent ones. Where truth has collapsed into commonness, then critical thinking isn't necessary, which makes the work of assessing evidence superfluous. The effect is the kind of nonthinking activities against which Ortega y Gasset argued. There are two extremes of this. On the one hand, there is oversimplicity that demands no reflection. On the other hand, there IS the dense, abstruse appearance of expertise that conceals an absence of thought. Both don't require thinking because their ultimate appeal is appearance. ¶ Evidence is paradoxically that which has been hidden but revealed as a conduit for the appearance of another hidden reality. In effect, then, It is an appearance that enables appearance, but it is an appearance that requires thinking in order to appear. In short, it is not an appearance that stimulates thought but a form of thought that stimulates appearance. This means that evidence is always symbolic; it always refers beyond Itself. Because whether affirmed or rejected, it always extends itself publicly for assessment, evidence is peculiarly social. And since it is social, evidence is subject to the complex exchange of intersubjective activities. Evidence must, in other words be subject to norms" and "criteria." By norms, I don't here mean normativity or social prejudices but instead an understanding of where an exceptional instance versus a typical instance of a case holds. This requires further understanding of relevance, which, too, requires the value of distinction. All this together provides a clue to the contemporary problem. When simply the performance of presenting evidence substitutes for evidence, then anything can count as evidence. We see this in scholarly texts where the authors announce the importance of looking at a subject and then later argue as though that announcement itself constituted examination. Think, as well, of some texts in literary and cultural studies with long, run-on commentary in end notes and footnotes that serve no role of substantiating the claims they supposedly demarcate. We also see it in cases where pronouncements of past failures of certain social remedies take the form of perennial truths.

#### II. Afro-pessimism’s ontologization of the constitutive foundation of the world and Blackness is decadent. Afro-pessimists exclude the possibility of meanings and concepts outside of their disciplinary boundaries, in fact making the slave a permanent sign through disciplinary cosmologies.

Lewis **Gordon 14**—professor of philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at the University of Connecticut—2014 (“Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonization of Knowledge,” Africa Development 39.1: 81-92, 86-88).

Failure to appreciate reality sometimes takes the form of recoiling from it. An inward path of disciplinary solitude eventually leads to what I call disciplinary decadence.12 This is the phenomenon of turning away from living thought, which engages reality and recognises its own limitations, to a deontologised or absolute conception of disciplinary life. The discipline becomes, in solipsistic fashion, the world. And in that world, the main concern is the proper administering of its rules, regulations, or, as Fanon argued, (self-devouring) methods. Becoming ‘right’ is simply a matter of applying, as fetish, the method correctly. This is a form of decadence because of the set of considerations that fall to the wayside as the discipline turns into itself and eventually implodes. Decay, although a natural process over the course of time for living things, takes on a paradoxical quality in disciplinary formation. A discipline, e.g., could be in decay through a failure to realise that decay is possible. Like empires, the presumption is that the discipline must outlive all, including its own purpose.¶ In more concrete terms, disciplinary decadence takes the form of one discipline assessing all other disciplines from its supposedly complete standpoint. It is the literary scholar who criticises work in other disciplines as not literary. It is the sociologist who rejects other disciplines as not sociological. It is the historian who asserts history as the foundation of everything. It is the natural scientist that criticises the others for not being scientific. And it is also the philosopher who rejects all for not being properly philosophical. Discipline envy is also a form of disciplinary decadence. It is striking, for instance, how many disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences are now engaged in intellectual history with a focus on the Western philosophical canon. And then there is decadence at methodological levels. Textualism, for example, infects historiography at the level of archival legitimacy. Or worse, in some forms of textualism, the expectation of everything being contained in the text becomes evident in work in the human sciences that announce studying its subject through an analysis exclusively of texts on the subject. There are scholars in race theory, e.g., who seem to think that theorising the subject is a matter of determining what has been said on it by a small set of canonical texts. When appearance is reduced to textuality, what, then, happens to inquiry? What are positivism and certain forms of semiological imitation of mathematical phenomena but science envy? When biologism, sociologism, psychologism, and many others assert themselves, to what, ultimately, are they referring? In the human sciences, the problem becomes particularly acute in the study of problem people. Such people misbehave also in disciplinary terms. The failure to squeeze them into disciplinary dictates, from a disciplinarily decadent perspective, is proof of a problem with the people instead of the discipline. It serves as further proof of the pathological nature of such people.

#### III. Decadence allows the colonization of methods, thinking, and destroys the possibility of a decolonized ethics of the oppressed to overturn.

Lewis **Gordon 14**—professor of philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at the University of Connecticut—2014 (“Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonization of Knowledge,” Africa Development 39.1: 81-92, 88).

The first is regarding the political significance of this critique. For politics to exist, there must be discursive opposition over relations of power. Such activity involves communicative possibilities that rely on the suspension of violent or repressive forces. In effect, that makes politics also a condition of appearance. To be political is to emerge, to appear, to exist. Colonisation involves the elimination of discursive opposition between the dominant group and the subordinated group. A consequence of this is the attempted elimination of speech (a fundamental activity of political life) with a trail of concomitant conditions of its possibility. It is not that colonised groups fail to speak. It is that their speaking lacks appearance or mediation; it is not transformed into speech. The erasure of speech calls for the elimination of such conditions of its appearance such as gestural sites and the constellation of muscles that facilitates speech – namely, the face. As faceless, problem people are derailed from the dialectics of recognition, of self and other, with the consequence of neither self nor other. Since ethical life requires others, a challenge is here raised against models of decolonial practice that centre ethics. The additional challenge, then, is to cultivate the options necessary for both political and ethical life. To present that call as an ethical one would lead to a similar problem of coloniality as did, say, the problem of method raised by Fanon. European modernity has, in other words, subverted ethics. As with the critique of epistemology as first philosophy, ethics, too, as first philosophy must be called into question. It is not that ethics must be rejected. It simply faces its teleological suspension, especially where, if maintained, it presupposes instead of challenging colonial relations. Even conceptions of the ethical that demand deference to the Other run into trouble here since some groups, such as blacks and Indians/Native Americans, are often not even the Other. This means, then, that the ethical proviso faces irrelevance without the political conditions of its possibility. This is a major challenge to liberal hegemony, which calls for ethical foundations of political life, in European modernity. It turns it upside down. But in doing so, it also means that ethics-centred approaches, even in the name of liberation, face a similar fate.

#### Not Contingent

#### The Symbolic Order is contingent, not a permanent and unchanging matrix of cultural meaning and symbols. Wilderson is simply wrong about the grammar of anti-Black violence being unmovable and fixated on the slave.

Peter Hudson-- senior lecturer in politics with research interest in social and political theory and South African studies at Wits Institute of Social and Economic Research—2014 (The State and Colonial Unconscious, *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies*, 39.2: 263-277,266).

Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the “othering” of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers.

To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division.

“Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation. “Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”– he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism.

Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the “structuring relation” of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial – i.e., anti-“white” – modes of struggle are not (just) “psychic” but involve the “reactivation” (or “de-sedimentation”)7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.

#### No cure: Wilderson

#### Wilderson’s theory is psycho-analytic: meaning it attempts to point out the antagonisms of the world, how whites proliferate their anti-Black desires and ultimately the Negrophobia that results in Anti-Black Death. There is NO CURE for this, Wilderson himself says his corpus does not articulate a cure!

Frank **Wilderson—July 14, 2010** (“Interview with Frank B. Wilderson: Wallowing in the Contradiction Part 1,” on *A Necessary Angel: The Ruminations, Prayers, and Complaints of Percy Howard* [http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/frank-b-wilderson-%E2%80%9Cwallowing-in-the-contradictions%E2%80%9D-part-1/] accessed 9.20.14).

**If Blacks became** part of the **human** community then **the concept of “contemporaries” would have no outside**; and if it had no outside it could have no inside. Lacan assumes the category and thus he imagines the analysand’s problem in terms of how to live without neurosis among ones contemporaries. Fanon interrogates the category itself. For Lacan the analysands suffer psychically due to problems extant within the paradigm of contemporaries. For Fanon, the analysand suffers due to the existence of the contemporaries themselves and the fact that s/he is a stimulus for anxiety for those who have contemporaries. Now, a contemporary’s struggles are conflictual—that is to say, they can be resolved because they are problems that are of- and in the world. But a Blacks problems are the stuff of antagonisms: struggles that cannot be resolved between parties but can only be resolved through the obliteration of one or both of the parties. We are faced—**when dealing with the Black—with a set of psychic problems that cannot be resolved through any form of symbolic intervention such as psychoanalysis—though addressing them psychoanalytically we can begin to explain the antagonism (as I have done in my book,** and as Fanon does), **but it won’t lead us to a cure.**

### AT Don’t use state

#### Blacks were not supposed to discuss issues of the day and were limited to racial discussions for the support or CRITICISM of politicians seeking office. Limits what my body can talk about.

#### WOODSON founder of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History 1933

Carter G.- (1875-1950), African American historian and educator; founder and editor of the Journal of Negro History and the Negro History Bulletin; *THE MISEDUCATION OF THE NEGRO;* p.92

In the North the Negroes have a better chance to acquire knowledge of political matters of the simple kind, but the bosses do not think it is advisable to enlighten them thoroughly. Negroes in parts are employed in campaigns, but they are not supposed to discuss such issues of the day as free trade, tariff for protection, the World Court, and the League of Nations. These Negro workers are supposed to tell their people how one politician seeking office has appointed more Negro messengers or charwomen in the service than the other or how the grandfather of the candidate stood with Lincoln and Grant through their ordeal and thus brought the race into its own. Another important task of these Negroes thus employed is also to abuse the opposing party, showing how hostile it has been to the Negro while the highly favorable party was doing so much for the race.

#### THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS INEVITABLY IMPORTANT – It is the only avenue in which we can break down the institutional effects of racism

#### FRANKLIN James B. Duke Professor Emeritus of History Duke University 1993

John Hope-1985-1992 was Professor of legal History in the Law School at Duke University; *THE COLOR LINE: Legacy for the Twenty First Century*; p. 73-74

We now live in an age when the role of government is inevitably important whether we are referring to preschool education in Seattle or the aircraft industry in that area, whether we are talking about welfare in Detroit or the creaky, wavering automotive industry there. What we need so desperately is the assumption of responsibility at the highest levels in the public and private sectors to make a strong pitch for the elimination of the uglier aspects of the color line so that we can have a healthier, happier, even gentler society. We need to appreciate the importance of legislation, judicial decisions, and executive orders in setting the stage for eliminating the color line. Without them it is not possible for individuals or groups of individuals, however dedicated, to make a good-faith and successful effort to eliminate the color line. Yet we cannot expect too much of these public efforts, important as they are. These public efforts must be combined with private efforts to promote mutual respect and a willingness to make judgments of others based on what they have done and can do, and not on who they are. If we can somehow teach ourselves these lessons in human relations, perhaps we can take the first feeble steps toward creating the kind of community about which some of our forebears spoke and wrote, and the kind of nation about which so many of us have dreamed but never realized

Only state action can create real change, K’s must be tied to implementable policy options

Bryant, Levi, 20**12**, Ph.D. in Philosophy from Loyola, Underpants Gnomes: A Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/,

The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

### AT Violence not in media

#### VIOLENCE IS EMBEDDED WITHIN OUR MEDIA AS WELL

[Don **Hazen**](http://www.alternet.org/authors/don-hazen), [Jan Frel](http://www.alternet.org/authors/jan-frel) - [AlterNet](http://alternet.org/) We Are a Country Drenched in Bloodshed: Some Hard Truths About Violence in the Media There are many causes of violence in our culture, but the least understood is the heavy influence of media. December 20, 20**12**

Add to this gnarly mix of causes **300 million handguns in a third of American homes** -- and you have a ticking time bomb. Then, you place all of the elements in the context of the **pervasive violence in media, so prevalent that it's almost like the air we breathe**. It starts with "killer" toys aimed at toddlers, moves to the most violent video games imaginable, then to films and television shows with numerous acts of violence, seen daily by hundreds of millions of people. **Many of these depictions glorify** brutishness, macho insensitivity, **misogyny, racism, and barbaric behavior**. According to [Sophie Janicke](http://www.academia.edu/1270752/Janicke_S._H._2011_._Violence_in_broadcast_regulation_A_comparative_analysis_of_broadcast_regulation_in_Germany_and_the_United_States) of Florida State University, who references the National Television Study (1998), two out of three TV programs contain violence, amounting to six violent acts an hour. The majority of this content is shown in children's programming (69%). **It has been estimated that by the age of 18, the American youth will have seen 16,000 murders, and 200,000 acts of violence only on television."**   The end result is the mess we are in as a society. And there is no easy way out. Because the problem of violence is so omnipresent, clouding many people's daily lives with fear, real or imagined, distorting relationships and many aspects of human interaction, **we must start to seriously look at the prevalence of media violence and try to imagine how we might make it better.** We must acknowledge that the media adds to the dangerous brew of violence in our culture. The rush for some kind of symbolic or even modestly substantive gun control legislation is understandable. There is no question that reducing the number of guns in the country, especially making them harder to access when someone has the urge to kill, will result in fewer violent deaths. However, **gun control is not a quick, easy** or comprehensive **solution to the problem of** perpetual **violence.** The battle for gun safety -- given the political realities and the pervasiveness of guns -- won't even begin to address the massive, interlocking and mutually reinforcing violent aspects of our culture. **Future generations may benefit from what**ever **we are able to accomplish now in terms of gun reforms.** But there are many other factors to tackle, and solely focusing on gun control is not enough

Ban guns. All guns. Get rid of guns in homes, and on the streets, and, as much as possible, on police. Not just because of San Bernardino, or whichever mass shooting may pop up next, but also not *not*because of those. Don’t sort the population into those who might do something evil or foolish or self-destructive with a gun and those who surely will not. As if this could be known—as if it could be assessed without massively [violating civil liberties](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/07/my-fellow-liberals-don-t-support-obama-s-terror-watch-list-gun-ban.html) and [stigmatizing](http://www.psmag.com/health-and-behavior/the-mental-illness-stigma) the mentally ill. Ban guns! Not just gun violence. Not just certain guns. Not just already-technically-illegal guns. All of them. I used to refer to my position on this issue as being in favor of gun control. Which is true, except that “**gun control” at its most radical still tends to refer to bans on *certain*weapons and closing loopholes.** The recent *New York Times*front-page editorial, as much as it[infuriated some](http://www.buzzfeed.com/davidmack/quite-literally), was still too tentative. “Certain kinds of weapons, like the slightly modified combat rifles used in California, and certain kinds of ammunition, must be outlawed for civilian ownership,” the paper argued, making the case for “reasonable regulation,” nothing more. Even the [rare](http://www.salon.com/2015/12/04/the_second_amendment_must_go_we_ban_lawn_darts_its_time_to_ban_guns/) ban-guns arguments involve prefacing and hedging and disclaimers. “We shouldn’t ‘take them away’ from people who currently own them, necessarily,” [writes](http://www.salon.com/2015/12/04/the_second_amendment_must_go_we_ban_lawn_darts_its_time_to_ban_guns/) Hollis Phelps in Salon. Oh, but we should. I say this not to win some sort of ideological purity contest, but because ***banning guns* urgently needs to become a rhetorical and conceptual possibility.** **The national conversation needs to shift from one extreme—an acceptance, ranging from complacent to enthusiastic, of an individual right to own guns—to another, which requires people who are not politicians to speak their minds**. And this will only happen if the Americans who are quietly convinced that guns are terrible speak out. Their wariness, as far as I can tell, comes from two issues: a readiness to accept the Second Amendment as a refutation, and a reluctance to impose “elite” culture on parts of the country where guns are popular. (There are other reasons as well, not least [a fear of getting shot](http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/12/07/people_should_protest_gun_shops_like_they_re_abortion_clinics_oh_wait.html).) And there’s the extent to which it’s just so *ingrained*that banning guns is impossible, legislatively and pragmatically, which dramatically weakens the anti-gun position. The first issue shouldn’t be so complicated. It doesn’t take specialized expertise in constitutional law to understand that current U.S. gun law gets its parameters from Supreme Court [interpretations](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/us/supreme-court-will-not-hear-challenge-to-assault-weapons-ban-of-highland-park-ill.html?src=me) of the Second Amendment. But it’s right there in the First Amendment that we don’t have to simply nod along with what follows. That the Second Amendment has been liberally interpreted doesn’t prevent any of us from saying it’s been misinterpreted, or that it should be repealed. When you find yourself assuming that everyone who has a more nuanced (or just pro-gun) argument is simply better read on the topic, remember that opponents of abortion aren’t wondering whether they should have a more nuanced view of  abortion because of *Roe v. Wade*. They’re not keeping their opinions to themselves until they’ve got a term paper’s worth of material proving that they’ve studied the relevant case law. Then there is the privilege argument. If you grew up somewhere in America where gun culture wasn’t a thing (as is my situation; I’m an American living in Canada), or even just in a family that would have never considered gun ownership, you’ll probably be accused of looking down your nose at gun culture. As if gun ownership were simply a cultural tradition to be respected, and not, you know, about *owning guns*. Guns… I mean, must it really be spelled out what’s different? It’s absurd to reduce an anti-gun position to a snooty aesthetic preference. There’s also a more progressive version of this argument, and a more contrarian one, which involves suggesting that an anti-gun position is racist, because crackdowns on guns are criminal-justice interventions. Progressives who might have been able to brush off accusations of anti-rural-white classism may have a tougher time confronting arguments about the disparate impact gun control policies can have on marginalized communities.

**These, however, are criticisms of certain tentative, insufficient gun control measures—the ones that would leave small-town white families with legally-acquired guns well enough alone, allowing them to shoot themselves or one another and to let their guns enter the general population. Ban Guns, meanwhile, is not discriminatory in this way. It’s not about dividing society into**[**“good” and “bad”**](http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/why-good-guys-with-guns-wont-keep-us-safe/)**gun owners. It’s about placing gun ownership *itself*in the “bad” category.** It’s worth adding that the anti-gun position is ultimately about police not carrying guns, either. That could never happen, right? Well, certainly not if we keep on insisting on its impossibility. Ask yourself this**: Is the pro-gun side concerned with how *it*comes across? More to the point: Does the fact that someone opposes gun control demonstrate that they’re culturally sensitive to the concerns of small-town whites, as well as deeply committed to fighting police brutality against blacks nationwide? I’m going to go with *no*and *no*on these. (The NRA exists!) On the pro-gun-control side of things, there’s far too much timidity. What’s needed to stop all gun violence is a vocal *ban guns* contingent. Getting bogged down in discussions of what’s feasible keeps what needs to happen—*no more guns*—from entering the realm of possibility. Public opinion needs to shift. The no-guns stance needs to be an identifiable place on the spectrum,**

[Phoebe Maltz **Bovy**](https://newrepublic.com/authors/phoebe-maltz-bovy) December 10, 20**15** *It’s Time to Ban Guns. Yes, All of Them*  Phoebe Maltz Bovy is a writer living in Toronto. She is writing a book with St. Martin’s Press about the idea of privilege (2017).

### AT POLICE GOOD

#### Or nah

### AT CRIMINALIZATION

#### We solve police don’t have guns

### AT Politics

#### AT Warming Impact: The 1ac’s race-neutral depiction of environmental crisis DEBILITATES effective movements, renders INVISIBLE constant violence against people of color, and REINFORCES white privilege—the 1ac’s intent aside, this discursive choice means that the alternative will always be a better option. Wise 08:

Wise 10. Tim Wise, renowned anti-racist activist and theorist, advisor to the Fisk University Race Relations Institute, doesn’t need a degree in climate science because he is talking about the social theory behind global warming, “With Friends Like These, Who Needs Glenn Beck?” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/08/18/894176/-With-Friends-Like-These-Who-Needs-Glenn-Beck-Racism-and-White-Privilege-on-the-Liberal-Left#

But as troubling as colorblindness can be when evinced by liberals, colormuteness may be even worse. Colormuteness comes into play in the way **many on the white liberal-left** fail to give voice to the connections between a given issue about which they are passionate, and the issue of racism and racial inequity. So, for instance, **when environmental activists** focus on the harms of pollution to the planet in the abstract, or to non-human species, but largely ignore the day-to-day environmental issues facing people of color, like disproportionate exposure to lead paint, or municipal, medical and toxic waste, they marginalize black and brown folks within the movement, and in so doing, reinforce racial division and inequity. Likewise, when climate change activists focus on the ecological costs of global warming, but fail to discuss the way in which climate change disproportionately affects people of color around the globe, they undermine the ability of the green movement to gain strength, and they reinforce white privilege. How many climate change activists, for instance, really connect the dots between global warming and racism? Even as people of color are twice as likely as whites to live in the congested communities that experience the most smog and toxic concentration thanks to fossil fuel use? Even as heat waves connected to climate change kill people of color at twice the rate of their white counterparts? Even as agricultural disruptions due to warming -- caused disproportionately by the white west -- cost African nations $600 billion annually? Even as the contribution to fossil fuel emissions by people of color is 20 percent below that of whites, on average? Sadly, these facts are typically subordinated within climate activism to simple "the world is ending" rhetoric, or predictions (accurate though they may be) that unless emissions are brought under control global warming will eventually kill millions. Fact is, warming is killing a lot of people now, and most of them are black and brown. To build a global movement to roll back the ecological catastrophe facing us, environmentalists and clean energy advocates must connect the dots between planetary destruction and the real lives being destroyed currently, which are disproportionately of color. To do anything less is not only to engage in a form of racist marginalizing of people of color and their concerns, but is to weaken the fight for survival.

AT Extinction Impact:

#### The DEATH CULTURE posed by nuclear war has already ENDED the world for people of color, SURVIVAL AT ANY COST outweighs LIBERTY, PEACE and DIGNITY. People of color face NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST and GENOCIDE through their jobs, housing, schools, families and land. Someone MUST STAND UP and make the connection between NUCLEAR ARSENALS, RACISM, SEXISM and IMPERIALISM.

**Omolade** a historian of black women for the past twenty years and an organizer in both the women’s and civil rights/black power movements 19**84**Barbara; Women of Color and the Nuclear Holocaust; WOMEN’S STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vaol. 12., No. 2, Teaching about Peace, War, and Women in the Military, Summer, p. 12; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4004305> City College Center for Worker Education in New York City

**In April, 1979, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency released a report on the effects of nuclear war that concludes that, in a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 25 to 100 million people would be killed. This is approximately the same number of African people who died between 1492 and 1890 as a result of the African slave trade to the New World.** **The same federal report also comments on the destruction of urban housing that would cause massive shortages after a nuclear war, as well as on the crops that would be lost, causing massive food shortages. Of course, for people of color the world over, starvation is already a common problem, when, for example, a nation’s crops are grown for export rather than to feed its own people. And the housing of people of color throughout the world’s urban areas is already blighted and inhumane: families live in shacks, shanty towns, or on the streets; even in the urban areas of North America, the poor may live without heat or running water. For people of color, the world as we knew it ended centuries ago. Our world, with its own languages, customs and ways, ended. And we are only now beginning to see with increasing clarity that our task is to reclaim that world, struggle for it, and rebuild it in our own image. The “death culture” we live in has convinced many to be more concerned with death than with life, more willing to demonstrate for “survival at any cost” than to struggle for liberty and peace with dignity. Nuclear disarmament becomes a safe issue when it is not linked to the daily and historic issues of racism, to the ways in which people of color continue to be murdered. Acts of war, nuclear holocausts, and genocide have already been declared on our jobs, our housing, our schools, our families, and our lands. As women of color, we are warriors, not pacifists. We must fight as a people on all fronts, or we will continue to die as a people. We have fought in people’s wars in China, in Cuba, in Guinea-Bissau, and in such struggles as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and in countless daily encounters with landlords, welfare departments, and schools. These struggles are not abstractions, but the only means by which we have gained the ability to eat and to provide for the future of our people. We wonder who will lead the battle for nuclear disarmament with the vigor and clarity that women of color have learned from participating in other struggles. Who will make the political links among racism, sexism, imperialism, cultural integrity, and nuclear arsenals and housing? Who will stand up?**

Link turns:

1. So we talking bout black males getting shot by the police, and your answer is politics? Really? We should care that much about the political climate that we should not pass a plan that has solvency to stop or atleast reduced black male death? LINK TURN. This is how whiteness operates, it allows us to assume that some external issue in politics is more important than the tangible material one we face right now

### AT 50 states

#### States racist af fam

#### This allows the pathology of black males

Dr. Tommy J. **Curry** The Eschatological Dilemma: The Problem of Studying the Black Male only as the Deaths that Result from Anti-Black Racism. 20**14**

Today, the Black intellectual writes and assimilates Blackness into the colonial categories of disciplines to escape actual death—real physical death, and attempts to distance themselves from this death through class mobility and social recognition, the Black class able to observe the dying Black folk. Blackness is written out of the academic enterprise generally, forced into conceptual expressions of convergence and canonical imitation, while **Black maleness is** altogether ignored and erased specifically**, thought of** only **as pathological;** the platform from which other gendered discourses form in reaction towards. In spite of the world before us, where **young Black boys—children—are murdered by the state,** and other **white vigilantes for their potentiality and propensity to become Black men, academic writing—the research it aims to convey, remains categorically indifferent to the contradictions that Black maleness holds in a white supremacist state that not only denies “masculinity,**” to Black men and boys, **but imposes patriarchy upon them as them concretely in the unfettered and accepted violence against them wielded not only by white men and women, but rationally enforced by the state.**[[1]](#endnote-1) For these studies, the “writing about,” is not enough. **The erasure of the Black male from philosophical and conceptual study is not the result of “a failure to attend to,” but rather a deliberate attention to the need to** displace/**eliminate the realities of Black men deaths,** and the violence against Black boys, our children, to enforce the division between disciplinary knowledge and the “problem people” observed as objects of study.[[2]](#endnote-2)

1. The accepted paradigm of investigating Black (heterosexist) existence and political power has almost exclusively been framed by Michelle Wallace’s *The Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman* (New York: The Dial Press, 1979), and bell hooks subsequent analysis of phallocentrism articulated in *Black Looks: Race and Representation* (Boston: South End Press, 1992) and her 2004 work *We Reel Cool: Black Men and Masculinity* (New York: Routledge). More recently, Athena D. Mutua’s edited collection entitled *Progressive Black Masculinities* (New York: Routledge, 2006), has attempted to address the gap in research and attention to the ways that Black men are specifically gendered and hence vulnerable to gendered violence, but as demonstrated throughout the collection sexism emerges as dominant moral category of analysis set against the other economic and political disadvantages of Black men. In other words, while Black men are oppressed racially, thy must make an ethical decision to prioritize other systems of domination above their own oppression by racism, or their specific gendered oppressions. Drawing upon the pivotal term of “progressive,” Mutua’s essay “Theorizing Progressive Black Masculinities,” in *Progressive Black Masculinities* argues that “progressive blackness therefore is this intervention. It is the ethical and active participation in antiracist struggles from the standpoint of black self-identity and black communities’ well-being…Ethical participation in antiracist struggles insists that the struggle not be dependent on or committed to the subordination of others. In addition it requires that participants be conscious of the relationships among identities, class, culture, gender, sexual orientation, region, religion, age, and the like” (8).

   Such an ethical stance certainly resonates with the en vogue theories of anti-racist and anti-sexist scholarship, but if the realities of racism and sexual violence are structural, then is it not possible that the matrix of interlocking oppressions obscure some ethical mandates. In other words, can or should Black men disempowered by racism, disenfranchised by incarceration, trust the ideals of equality that bring these ethical mandates into focus. How do Black men that can’t vote, that are surrounded by death, and unemployed, act against sexism, or classism, or homophobia, these prejudices that effect and limits the economic and political recognition of white women and educated Black women in the class above him in any meaningful way beyond their psychical endorsement of the belief? And in what relation does the enjoyment of education, economic, and political power over this group of Black men, what Michelle Alexander has called under-casted men in her book the *New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: The New Press, 2010), become anti-progressive Blackness that exceeds our mere designation of racism? [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Recently Black male feminist literature demonstrates the problem I am trying to articulate in the study of Black men. Pop culture scholarship like Mark Anthony Neal’s *Looking for Leroy: Illegible Black Masculinities* (New York: New York University Press, 2013) makes the Black male body a configuration that performs variety, but is hidden illegible in many regards. The legible stereotypes of Black male bodies like the bad Black man is not oppositionally fixed in Neal’s thought, but these performances of Black masculinity are not directed at the concretization of what Black manhood is in the social. Pointing to Hank Willis Thomas’s *Strange Fruit*, “if Thomas’s work aims to disturb the comfort of the prevailing logics about black male bodies, it is a project that I share by suggesting the radical potential of rendering ‘legible’ black male bodies—those bodies that are all too real to us—‘illegible’, while simultaneously rendering so called illegible black male bodies—those male bodies we can’t believe as real—legible (8). There is a level of perception that is acted upon socially, how, one enforces their stereotypes and fears, but at the level of the conditions and constrains of social existence or death, these institutions remain unnamed in Neal’s work. This is not surprising given his work is on popular culture, but this is an example of how the death of Black men, the physical deaths of Black men are not analyzed as they are the cessation of Black male performance—the impossibility of being thought beyond a corpse. Similarly, his previous book *New Black Man* (New York: Routledge, 2006) situates Black masculinity as an ethical project in need of feminist reformation. These offer little analysis of the concrete obstacles and violences that occur to Black men in the world. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)